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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
under Section 78>-2a-3, Utah Code Ann., in that it is an appeal
from a final order entered in a civil proceeding.

The proceeding

below arose from a divorce action between the parties relating to
enforcement and interpretation of the original Divorce Decree
entered August 14, 1980.
ISSUES ON REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by

construing paragraph 7 of the Divorce Decree to require that Mr.
Bettinger's equity be reduced by costs of sale and costs of
improvements?
2.

Is I)efendant/Cross-Appellant# Mr. Bettinger,

entitled to interest on his lien from the date when his lien

became "foreclos^able" to the date of sale of the parties marital
domicile, where the court found that both Plaintiff Mrs. Boies and
Defendant Mr. Bettinger caused the failure to sell?
ST&EEMEKT OF CkSE
I.
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The parties were divorced by Decree entered August 14,
1980, which was leased upon a Stipulation by the parties.

From

1985 through 1983/ the parties have returned to court on at least
five separate occasions, each of which in some respect have
related to interpretation of Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Divorce
Decree.

During these three years, the court has accumulated

voluminous evidence on the parties respective positions regarding
interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree.
The Memorandum Decision upon which this appeal is based
was issued February 18, 1988 (Record P. 631-633; attached as
Exhibit A; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record P.
637-640, Exhibit B) issued from a hearing held February 9, 1988
and a hearing held December 12, 1987 (Order, Record P. 541-542,
Exhibit C) which was initiated by Mr. Bettinger's Motion for
Division of Sale Proceeds of marital domicile.

The Memorandum

Decision was finally reduced to an Order dated March 11, 1988.
(Exhibit D; Record P. 641-642)
Defendant Mr. Bettinger filed a Motion to Amend the
Order or Grant a New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure on March 18, 1988, which was denied September
13, 1988.

Mrs. Boies filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court on

May 5, 1988 (Court of Appeals No. 88-0297CA).

Defendant filed

this Cross-Appeal on September 26, 1988.
On October 19, 1988, pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals, Mrs. Boies appeal was consolidated
with another appeal filed in this case (Case No. 870500-CA).
However, the Court of Appeals failed to notify counsel for Mrs.
Boies of the due date of the Brief in the matter and Defendant
Bettinger moved to dismiss the appeal on March 14, 1989.

On

March 23, 1989, Plaintiff's counsel filed a "Motion for an
Enlargement of Time".
The Court of Appeals granted Plaintiff's Motion,
extending the time for filing the Brief in Case No. 8700297-CA to
April 19, 1989 and denying Mr. Bettinger's Motion to Dismiss.
II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Decree of Divorce in this matter was entered August
14, 1980.

Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Divorce Decree have been the

source of constant dispute between the parties due to the unclear
language contained therein and differing interpretations
resulting in varying benefits to the parties.
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Divorce Decree read as
follows:
"7. Plaintiff is awarded the real property of the
marriage in the form of a home located at 2740 East 4510
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to a lien thereon
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for one-half the equity that may be in the house at the
time of liquidation (which contemplates an increasing
equity as the value increases). The equity is defined
as the fair market value or sales price at the time
Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set
forth herein, less the amount of mortgages, costs of
improvements made by Plaintiff and costs of sale. This
lien shall not be forecloseable until the youngest child
reaches age 18, or until the home is sold or until
Plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence of any of these
events, two-thirds of the house payments then made shall
be converted to child support and that sum shall be paid
to the Plaintiff on a monthly basis as additional child
support.
8. Defendant is ordered to continue making the payments
on the home. Defendant shall also be entitled to take
the entire interest portion of the house payment as a
deduction for himself as well as three (3) income tax
exemptions on the children with Plaintiff to receive 1
exemption on the youngest child at the present time."
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Divorce Decree contemplate
that Mr. Bettinger will pay the mortgage payments on the home,
receive the interest deductions related thereto for tax purposes
and he has an equity interest which will vary with the value of
the home over time.

Rather than being a "creditor" of Mrs.

Boies, Mr. Bettinger is an equal owner of the property, who, pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties made in open court, took
the risk of fluctuation in market price as an investment.
(Affidavit of Mrs. Boies, Paragraph 4; Record P. 312-313; Exhibit
E hereto)
Prior to Mrs. Boies remarriage on August 14, 1984, she
and her husband offered to purchase Mr. Bettinger1s equity
interest in the home.

(February 9, 1988 Transcript, pp. 13-14,

hereinafter denominatd "Tr. p."; and Aff. Mrs. Boies, Record p.
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311-322, Exhibit E hereto)

Mr.

Bettinger replied to her offer

of purchase stating that the home should be worth $125,000.00 in
good shape and in no way less than $100,000.00 (Tr. p. 15, Line
17-19; Hearing Exhibit P-3 attached hereto as Exhibit F ) . At
that time, August, 1984, Mr. Bettinger believed that the home was
worth $125,000.00 (Tr. p. 16).
Mrs. Boies lived at the home for approximately 10 months
after marriage.

Originally, Mrs. Boies believed the home should

be listed for $85,000.00; however, due to the insistence of Mr.
Bettinger, the home was listed for sale at $125,000.00 (Tr. p.
35).

The home was subsequently listed for a two year period with

a variety of different listing agents until the price was dropped
to $97,000.00 (Tr. p. 36-38).

The home had a flat roof which

resulted in substantial leaking, damaging the roof and ceiling of
the home (Tr. P. 38). In order to make the home sellable, Mrs.
Boies replaced the roof with a gabled roof costing $7,800.00 (Tr.
p. 38, 39). During the entire time the home was up for sale,
only one offer to purchase outright was made which ultimately was
accepted in April, 1987 (Tr. p. 51). However, when the house was
initially listed for sale, Mrs. Boies had available a lease with
an option to purchase which she sent to Mr. Bettinger.

The deal

did not go through since Mr. Bettinger would not reply and accept
the offer (Tr. p. 4 9 ) .
Mr. Jerry Webber testified as an expert appraiser on
behalf of Mrs. Boies that homes with gabled roofs sell for signi-
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ficantly more than homes with flat roofs, especially where water
damage has occurred (Tr. p. 61, 68).
The costs of sale in August, 1987, were $6,113.00.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Paragraph 7 of the Decree on its face requires that

Mr. Bettinger's equity is the fair market value or sales price
less the costs of improvements and costs of sale, which was properly interpreted by the Court in its ruling.
2.

In the alternative, substantial extrinsic evidence

supports the Court's interpretation of paragraph 7 where the
Court determines that Paragraph 7 is ambiguous.
3.

The Court found that both parties were at fault in

delaying the sale of the home and under an equitable theory
declined to charge interest on Mr. Bettinger's lien, especially
where he had taken the risk of the investment on a equal footing
with Mrs. Boies.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPH 7 REQUIRES COSTS AND IMPROVEMENTS
BE DEDUCTED FROM MR. BETTINGER'S

EQUITY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S CONSTRUCTION.
A.

Standard of Review.

The main point before the Lower

Court has been interpretation of Paragraph 7 of the Divorce
Decree.

The language of judgments is subject to construction

according to the rules that apply to all written instruments.
Moon Lake Water Users Association v. Hanson, 535 P.2d 1262, 1264
(Utah 1975).

In the event the language of a judgment is clear

and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written; however, when
the meaning is ambiguous, the entire record or extrinsic evidence
may be resorted to for construction of the judgment.

Park City

Utah Corp. v. Ensign Company, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978).

If

a contract, or in this case, language of a judgment, is unambiguous, interpretation is a question of law, and on review, the
Supreme Court will accord the trial court's construction no particular weight, reviewing its action under a "correctness standard."

Kimball v.

Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).

However, if the contract, or in this case the judgment, is ambiguous, and the trial court bases its construction on extrinsic
evidence, the construction is reviewed as a question of fact and
the Supreme Court's review is "strictly limited".

Id.

Craig

Food Industries, Inc. v. Wheihing, 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App.
1987).
Additionally, on review, Utah appellate courts will
accord considerable defference to the judgment of the trial court
due to its advantaged position and will not disturb the action of
that court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the
contrary, or the trial court abuses its discretion or misapplies
principals of law.

Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297,

1299 (Utah 1981).
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B.

Judge Young correctly interpreted the plain language

of Paragraph 7.

Paragraph 7 is set forth in its entirety, infra.

The paragraph clearly defines equity as the fair market value or
sales price at the time Defendant becomes entitled to liquidate
the lien.

However, it additionally states that the value of

equity will be decreased by "the amount of mortgages, costs of
improvements made by Plaintiff and costs of sale."
constraints are put on the deduction.

No time

This plain language is re-

enforced by the fact that it results from a Stipulation entered
into by the parties in open court.
The plain language interpretation employed by the Court
is also consistent with its April 21, 1987 ruling where Judge
Young interprets Paragraph 7 of the Decree to mean that the
Defendant's child support obligation is increased by a sum equal
to two-thirds of the monthly mortgage payment, but is relieved
from making the monthly installment payment on the mortgage of
the family home.
C.

("Order", Record p. 387-391.)

In the alternative, the ambiguous nature of the

language was properly construed in light of the evidence.

Judge

Young spent two years looking at paragraph 7, went through
several hearings, listened to a variety of witnesses, read
several affidavits and examined several exhibits.

Undoubtedly,

substantial extrinsic evidence was required to make a final
determination.

The interpretation of Paragraph 7 culminated in

the Order now before the Court based upon the Defendant's Motion
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II.
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE
TO CHARGE INTEREST ON THE DEFENDANT'S LIEN WHERE BOTH PARTIES
WERE AT FAULT
Paragraph 1 of the Court's Memorandum Decision states:
"The Court finds that each party could and should have
been more efficient and expeditious in selling the property, or bringing the matter appropriately to the
Court's attention, and that thus each must bear some
responsibility for delay." (Record P. 631)
Paragraph 8 of the Court's Finding of Fact states:
"The delay in selling the marital domicile is found to be
the fault of both parties." (Record P. 638)
The standard for appellate review in equity cases is that
the Court will not upset the lower Court's Finding of Fact unless
there is no substantial evidence to support them; the Appellant
must marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings
and then demonstrate that even when viewed in light most
favorable to factual determinations made by the Court, evidence
is insufficient to support its findings.

Harline v. Campbell,

728 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1986)
The Court's findings demonstrate a clear intent to
adjust the equities when interpreting the unclear Divorce Decree.
Neither Mrs. Boies nor Mr. Bettinger could forecast the outcome
of the Court's ruling and both made serious mistakes when dealing
with the property.

This is especially true where Mr. Bettinger

did nothing to foreclose his lien, continuously insisted on a
selling price which was far too high for the market to support
and even rejected an initial lease with the option to purchase.
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MEMORANDUM
-80-931

Plaintiff,
vs.
CASS BETTINGER,
Defendant.
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Court
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T h e Court heard

witnesses, their

.«. arguments v~ counsel.
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determining

t h e distribution
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proceeds resulting from t h e sale.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
1.

T h e Court finds that each

been more effi c:i e

xpeditious

should have
sc

•:; -:ie property, ^ T

bi m g i n g t h e matter appropriately to t h e Court*
that thus each must bear sonw- H'Si-on^.,,
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. , ^

i
delay.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

,efendant, plus pro rata accrued

interest on

deposited funds.
C o n n '. i' I

I i 11

I 11
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ii

I
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Order in hanaony with this Memorandum Decision, and submit them
to opposing counsel for approval in harmony with the Local Rules.
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By

H#*JLIY

(— ((t^CTXZ ,

Deoiftv r #r)t

BETTINGER V. BETTINGER

PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE

the

I hereby certify that I mailed

correct copy of:

forego WM i l*H.'itu - =

•

following, this

fa

day of Februarx

Craig M. Peterson
Attorney for Plaintiff
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake Citv, Ut
Robert M. McDonald
Attorney for Defendant
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

cl±kdzL

r ».

Robert M. McDonald,
MCDONALD & BULLEN
Attorney for Defendant
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite -I'IIU
Salt Lake City, UT 8410J
Telephone: (801) 359-0999
_

«jn ?fv.| r\\^PY'S OFFICE
2^'fr Lake County I Jtah

8 1988

MAR
M

C;urt

"*?

0

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,

JOOOOOO

C A R O L Y N .JOVI 1 UK"! N INUI l>"

-

:

Plaintiff,

BINDINGS OF FACT A N D
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vs-

i * "i (<" J I \ h \ I)-80-9 111

•

C v

• " "•' :

',

,

David Young

Defendant.
--oo
This m a t t e r came o n for Hearing o n February
t h e H o n o r a b l e David S
j UJ. v .
Craig

the

sitting

\,i r h o i r

Pi ejjt.-'i 11 iii I ; n i i N 1 leai: :i i lg w e i e p] a:ii i i I::::i f f ai id 1 ler
11

Peterson,

McDonald
and

Young, Distri ct • Ji ldge,

. J O - .ct ire

and defendant

and his at t o n ley,

a

at tor i ley,

Robert

11

"The Court havi ng heard the testi mony of the wi tnesses,

havi ng considered
respect i ve
111 M ix11 v

] ir(\i1111-\es

the arguments ai i :i memor ai ida

a11orneys , and being

f u 11 y

7
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advi sea

he

t j i :i, t:eit: s i t:s F ':i i idings o f Fact and Cone 1 usions of

Law i
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
1980.

Plaintiff
f

*

nrd defendant

v^rr ^Ivnrried

on Auaii^^ M

'-irnaoe ' "»-- parties resides at .'. -;0 Fast 4 5 1 0
*?11

1

J

2.

Plaintiff remarried on August 30, 1984. Thereafter, she

and her new husband occupied the marital domicile for a period of
one year.

After the one-year period, plaintiff and her new hus-

band took up residence in another home.
3.

The market value of the marital domicile on August 30,

1984, was $95,000.00.

The unpaid balance on the first mortgage

against the marital domicile on August 30, 1984, was $20,304.00.
4.

Subsequent to August 30, 1984, plaintiff incurred the

sum of $7,800.00 for installation of a gabled roof on the marital domicile and $164.79 for new screens on the marital domicile.
These were capital improvements that enhanced the value of the
home and gave rise to a corresponding increase in the market
value of the home.
5.

Plaintiff made other expenditures with respect to the

marital domicile.

However, these additional expenditures consti-

tuted normal maintenance and are not the responsibility of
defendant.
6.

The marital domicile was sold on August 13, 1987, for a

purchase price of $91,500.00. The costs of sale were $6,113.00.
7.

The proceeds of sale were placed in an interest-bearing

escrow account wherein Guardian Title Company is escrow agent.
8.

The delay in selling the marital domicile is found to be

the fault of both parties.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court concludes:
1.

Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, defendant is
2

entitled to one-half of the equity in the marital domicile determined as of the date of plaintiff's remarriage on August 30,
1984.
2.

Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree, defendant's share

of the equity was due and payable on August 30, 1984.
3.

Defendant is not entitled to interest on the amount of

his equity which accrued prior to the time the sale proceeds were
placed with the escrow agent.
4.

Both parties are entitled to interest that has accrued

on their respective share of the escrowed funds since the funds
were placed in an interest-bearing escrow account by the escrow
agent.
5.

Each of the parties must bear one-half of the following

costs and expenses:
(a) Closing costs of $6,113.00;
(b) Capital improvements of $7,964.78.
6.

On or about April 12, 1987, this Court entered judg-

ment against plaintiff in the sum of $500.00.

Said judgment has

not yet been satisfied.
7.

Defendant is entitled to receive from the escrow agent

the sum of $30,309.11, together with interest that has accrued on
said sum from the date said funds were placed in the interestbearing escrow account until said sum is paid to defendant.
8.

In addition to the sum stated

in the preceding

paragraph, defendant is entitled to receive from the escrow agent
the sum of $500.00, together with interest at the rate of 12% per
3

annum from April 12, 1987, to the date of payment.

Provided,

however, that defendant shall first present to the escrow agent a
Satisfaction of Judgment which shall be delivered to plaintiff
upon payment of the sum stated in this paragraph.
DATED this ffctey of Eefe^rary, 1988.

BY THE COURT:

Judge David^S. Young^V

AT \ tzST
H. DIXON HH'^DLEY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
_ (£

I hereby certify that on the ZXS"

~' "

JT

Deputy Cierk

day of February, i988, I

caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by placing said copy in
the United States mail, postage prepaid addressed as follows:
Craig M. Peterson, Esq.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
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EXHIBIT C
Robert M. McDonald, (#2175)
MCDONALD & BULLEN
Attorney for Defendant
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 359-0999
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
OOOOooo
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

&0O-f£/

-vsCASS BETTINGER,

Judge David Young

Defendant.
oooOooo
Defendantf s Motion For Order Dividing Proceeds of Sale of
Marital Domicile was heard before the Honorable David S. Young,
District Judge, on Monday, December 12, 1987.

Present at said

hearing were Robert M. McDonald, of the firm of McDonald &
Bullen, representing Defendant and Craig Peterson, of the firm of
Littlefield & Peterson, representing Plaintiff.
heard

the

The Court having

arguments of counsel, and having

reviewed

the

Affidavits and Memoranda filed by the parties, and being fully
advised in the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Defendant's equity in the marital domicile shall be

determined on the basis of the market value of the marital domicile in August, 1984.

000541

2.

An evidentiary hearing shall be held before this Court

on Tuesday, January 19, 1988,

at the hour of 8:30 A.M. to deter-

mine the value of the marital domicile in August, 1984.

The

parties shall make necessary arrangements for the appearance of
their respective experts Jerry F. Kellgreen and Jerry R. Webber
to testify as to said value.
3.

The term "improvements" as stated in paragraph 7 in the

Decree of Divorce means "capital improvements" that enhance the
value of the marital domicile.
4.

In order to assist the parties in preparation for said

hearing, the Court makes the following Preliminary Findings and
Conclusions which remain subject to change or amendment:
(a) The cost of the sale of the marital domicile shall be
shared equally by the parties;
(b) Plaintiff shall be liable for all unpaid taxes attributable to periods after August, 1984;
DATED thisc^^day of December, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

Hi^DLEY
Owe*

3y

C faZt^Deputy Clerk
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FILED IN CLESK'S OFFICE
S«»! J.n^p County Utah

Robert M. McDonald, (#2175)
MCDONALD & BULLEN
Attorney for Defendant
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 359-0999
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER,
Plaintiff,

:
:

ORDER

-vs-

: Civil No. D-80-931

CASS BETTINGER,

: Judge David Young

Defendant.

:
oooOooo

Hearing in this matter was conducted before the Honorable
David S. Young, District Judge, on February 9, 1988.

Present at

said Hearing were plaintiff and her attorney, Craig Peterson, and
defendant and his attorney, Robert M. McDonald.

The Court having

the testimony of the witnesses, the arguments of counsel, and
having considered the authorities presented by the respective
parties, and being fully advised in the premises, and heretofore
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant Cass Bettinger is entitled to receive from

Guardian Title Company, the escrow agent holding the proceeds of
sale from the home located at 2740 East 4510 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, the sum of $30,309.11, together with all interest
1

that has accrued on said sum from the date the sale proceeds were
deposited in an interest-bearing escrow account to the date of
payment of defendant.
2.

Upon delivery to escrow agent of a duly executed

Satisfaction of Judgment, defendant Cass Bettinger shall further
receive fxorcv Guatf&i^v Title C O V M ^ U Y , t*\e escrow ^gervt UoLdiwg t*\e
sales proceeds of the home located at 2740 East 4510 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, the sum of $500.00, together with interest at
the rate of 12% per annum from April 14, 1987, to the date of
payment to defendant.
3.

All proceeds remaining with escrow agent after payment

of the sums above stated shall be delivered to plaintiff, Carolyn
Boies.
DATED this J L _ d a y of -February, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

ATT Es !
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/O.

I hereby certify that on the Q.S ~ day of February,- 1988, I
caused to be served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
Order by placincf said copy in the United States mail, postage
prepaid addressed as follows:
Craig M. Peterson, Esq.
LITTLEflELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

tk^hl
2
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MARY C. OORPORON #734
Attorney for Plaintiff
C0RP0R0N & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

FILED iN Ci.ERK'S OFFJCt
SALT i AK-: CC'JNTT. U7AH

Ufa 3 3 03 PH '87
u ttr.H 'MK*r«»r ~:.
- 7 ^ ? / ^ ^ ^

(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FDR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

CAROLYN JOYCE (BETTINGER) BOIES,
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF IN OPPOSITION TO
AFFIDAVIT OF CASS BETTINGER

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Civil No. D 80 931

CASS BETTINGER,

Judge David Young

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

1.

)

CAROLYN

BOIES, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as

I am

the plaintiff to the above action and the former wife of the

follows:
1#

defendant, Cass Bettinger.
2.

Defendant and I were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered in the

above court on August 14, 1980.
3.
dates

of

Defendant
birth

Cass, born

are

and

I are the parents of four children, whose names and

as

follows: Michelle, born June 19, 1967, Christopher

January 15, 1971, Jonathon Scott, bom March 11 , 1972 and Nicole,

born January 4, 1977.
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MATTERS PERTAINING 10 INTERPRETATION OF DIVORCE DECREE
4.

The

reached

by

agreement

Decree of Divorce

stipulation.

contained

in

entered

between defendant and myself was

It is critical for the court to understand how the
the Decree was arrived at. This is so because the

Decree, though containing what may seem to be unusual provisions to the court,
means

exactly what it states upon its face, and the provisions of the Decree

were

arrived

at

after

extensive

negotiation between the parties and their

counsel and after I had bargained away several claims I wanted in the divorce.
The negotiation process which resulted in the Decree is as follows:
a.

Initially, I sought from Cass Bettinger, the custody of our four

children, who were

all minors at the time, and child support in the sum of

$300.00

per month, per child, for a total support obligation of $1,200.00 per

month.

I asked for possession of the house, and in exchange, I agreed that I

would
a

pay the mortgage on the property and that the house would be subject to

lien in favor of Cass Bettinger for one-half the amount of our equity as it

existed in 1980, at the time of the divorce.
b.
my

Defendant, Cass Bettinger, rejected this offer of settlement on

part and stated to me at the time that his reasons for rejecting the offer

had

to

do with his perception of the increasing value of our home. Our home

had doubled in value from the date we purchased it in the early 1970fs through
the date of the divorce in 1980. Cass Bettinger repeatedly expressed to me at
the

time

value

of

the

divorce his belief that the property would again double in

during the 1980fs and that he wanted to participate in that increase in

equity

on

arrive

at a settlement whereby he would retain the house as an investment and

continue
receive

an investment basis. For that reason, he stated that he wanted to

to pay the mortgage on the property and whereby I would allow him to
any

increase

in equity

which might occur during the decade of the

2

000

1980's,
the

rather

Decree

than

taking one-half the equity as it existed at the time of

in 1980. He also agreed to pay one-half the cost of improvements

to maintain his investment. To date, he has paid nothing.
c.
house

and

equity

To

Cass

7 of

entirely

from

contains

our

calculated

lien

payable

to

election
these

in
the

house

Divorce

separating

the house and mortgage

Cass

value of the equity. I was awarded the home and

Bettinger

for one-half the "increasing" equity would be

Paragraph

I was

to receive, in addition to the child support

3 of the Decree, an additional amount of two-thirds of

payment on the home as additional child support to offset my costs
another residence for the children. Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of
was

to pay the mortgage payments on the hone, not as

support, but as a real estate investment for as long as we retained the
It was contemplated by myself and by defendant, and we discussed at

time we

create
in

increasing

Decree, defendant

property.
the

of

sell the home or upon my remarriage. Upon the first to occur of

providing

child

Decree

of the date of sale of the home, rather than as of 1980, which

contingencies,
in

home, we arrived at the settlement contained in

him upon our youngest child reaching the age of 18 years, upon my

to

ordered
the

the

the

the child support. First, Paragraph 7, in its first sentence,

an

to

in

agreement that defendant's equity interest in the home would be

as

contemplated

claim for child support and possession of the

Bettinger's competing claim for a continuing interest in any

appreciation

Paragraph

the

resolve my

the

a

reached

the stipulation in this case, that this would actually

slight reduction in the defendant's obligation to pay support to me

event

of my remarriage. We discussed the fact that this would occur

because we assumed that the house would sell quickly upon being placed on the
market
from

and

that because of the sale of the home, defendant would be relieved

the obligation in the Decree to pay the mortgage. We agreed on the fact

3

i-s.rW4**4I

M

that

his

payment

of

the mortgage on our home until the date the home sold

would not be support for the children, and that it would be in addition to the
$200.00

per month, per child, child support ordered by the court and would

not

subject

be

to

dividing

as

the

children

left home. Mr. Bettinger1 s

contention that my remarriage should place some of the burden of child support
on my new husband is absurd. My new husband should not be required to support
the

Bettinger

children

of

children, especially

his

own

and

since

he

pays

child support for four

Mr. Bettinger earns over three times what my new

husband earns.
5.

The understanding we both agreed to of Paragraphs 3, 7 and 8 of the

Decree of Divorce at the time we negotiated for settlement on the terms of the
Decree

was

child

that

in my custody, that I would have the house payment made on the marital

home until
the

I would receive $200.00 per month, per child, for any minor

such time as the home sold, and that, in addition, upon my moving

children to a new home, I would receive an amount equal to two-thirds the

mortgage

payment on the marital home, which would be paid as additional child

support.

I agreed to this arrangement in the interest of negotiation in lieu

of

to trial and demanding $300.00 per month, per child as a set sum of

going

child

support.

housing

costs

The
for

two-thirds mortgage payment was intended to supplement

the children in a new residence, but does not affect Mr.

Bettinger!s obligation for the house payment as long as it exists.
6.
payments

Paragraph 4 of the Decree of Divorce provides that my child support
of

$200.00

per child, per month, were to increase by eight percent

(8%) on August 1 of each year after the Decree, which has been ignored by Mr.
Bettinger since February of 1985.
CALCULATION OF SUPPORT ARREARAGES
7.

In January, 1985, the above-referenced matter was tried before Judge

4

OGO

John A.

Rokich. As a result of that trial, I was awarded continuing custody

of our minor children, Nicole and Chris. Our daughter, Michelle, achieved her
majority
custody

shortly
of

our

thereafter

and

son, Jon.

After that change in custody, defendant was to

continue

to

rate

of

$200.00 per month, per child, together with the annual eight percent

(8%)

increase

together

with

provisions
payment

pay me

became emancipated. Defendant was awarded

associated
an

the

with

each of

those

child support payments, and

additional $25.00 per child in my custody, per month. The

regarding

of

mortgage

child support for the two children in my custody at the

the

house, payment

additional

child

of the mortgage on the house, and

support

in

the amount of two-thirds the

payment continued unchanged, the two-thirds amount going into effect

if and when we vacated the premises and I began to incur housing costs for the
children.
8.

After

defendant
should

the hearing

visited

my

regarding change of custody in February, 1985,

home and left his own calculation of how child support

be set after our son, Jon, went to live with him. That calculation is

attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit
"A."

I recognize my former husband's handwriting and the document as Exhibit

"A"

is in his handwriting. This document demonstrates his verification to me

in

early

1985

that

he

interpreted the child support obligation, after the

change in custody, as follows, and not as he now claims in his Memorandum:
a.
$544.00,

Prior

to

the

change

in custody, his support obligation was

payable on the first of the month and $544.00 payable on the 16th of

the month,

together with

Prudential,

for

a

total

the mortgage

payment

support obligation

of

of

$292.00, payable

to

$1,380.00 per month. The

$544.00 co the first and $544.00 on the 16th of the month reflects the support
obligation

of

$200.00

per month, per child, for all four children, together

5

ooo

with

the

annual

increases

in

support of eight percent (8%).

This is the

calculation reflected on Exhibit "A" by the word "was."
b.

Cass Bettinger then indicated to me his understanding that the

total

support

child

would

custody

another
in

be

of

indicated

obligation

of $1,380.00 should be divided in half because one

emancipated

and

he would

have one child, leaving me with

two children. After this obligation was divided in half, he also
to me

that

there

should

be paid, in addition to that one-half,

$25.00 per month, per child in my custody, as ordered by Judge Rokich

early

1985.

This

left

him with a total monthly support obligation of

$715.00 per month, and is reflected in that portion of Exhibit "A" by the word
"now.1'
c.
after

the

Of

the

change

mortgage

on

$211.50

was

in custody, $292.00 was to be paid to Prudential for the

the marital

in

home

and

$211.50 was to be paid on the first and

to be paid on the 16th of every month. In other words, I was to

receive, directly,
reflected

total support obligation of $715.00 per month payable

a

total of $423.00 per month as child support. This is

the mathematical calculations contained in the lower portion of

Exhibit "A."
9.
$292.00
11

In

early

per month.

1985, the mortgage

payment on the marital payment was

In 1986, it increased to $333.00 per month, for the last

months of the year. Effective February, 1987, it has decreased to $310.00

per month.
10.
to by

In addition to the child support set forth by the Decree and admitted
Cass Bettinger in Exhibit "A,lf I am entitled to receive a sum equal to

two-thirds
the

the

house

payment as additional support, divided equally between

two monthly payments as of the time the children were relocated to a new

residence.

Effective

February

1, 1985 (the time the custody change became

6
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effective) the total amount owed on the first of the month was $297.00 and the
total

amount

$272.00, +

owed

on

the

16th of

the month was $297.00. ($544.00 -f 2 =

$25.00 additional support awarded by Judge Rokich = $297.00. the

additional $25.00 per month, per child was awarded because, although the child
support

was

decreased

by 50%, my actual living costs were only decreased by

10%, when Jon moved.)
11.
as

Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference and designated

Exhibit

"B" is

arrearages,

the

commencing

true and

with

current

February

1,

calculation

of

child

support

1985, and continuing through the

present. As of the end of March, 1987, the total support arrearage owed to me
by defendant was $10,086.80.
12.

As

continued

erroneously

retained

had

skipped payment totally for February, 1985, and

to claim the house payment as support, in May, 1985, I

the

services of my former counsel, Mr. Con Kostopulos, to assist me

a

claim for the child support manipulation and arrearages against

in making
the

defendant

defendant. My Order to Show Cause on support arrearages was heard by the

Commissioner

in September, 1985, and the Commissioner issued a recommendation

on

31 , 1985, to

December

the effect that defendant was indebted to me for

child support arrearages through October, 1985, in the sum of $2,705.50. Both
the

Commissioner

and

the

the

child support is due as stated in Exhibit "B." I request that the Office

of

evidence

Recovery

and the Office of Recovery Services have studied the Decree
(attached) and have determined defendant is in arrears and

Services1

and

the

Commissioner's

recommendations as to child

support

arrearages be sustained, and that I be granted an additional judgment

against

defendant for arrearages incurred after October, 1985, as well as the

amounts previously reduced to judgment by Judge Billings in 1986.
13.

In addition to being consistently in arrears in his child support,

7

ooo

defendant

has

failed

timely manner.

at

all."

When I have requested that the payments be sent on time, Mr.

As

Exhibit

"B" indicates, Mr. Bettinger has often been over two

late, and as much as 42 days late, in the payment of his child support.

This

has wrecked

planning,

As

to make his child support payments in a

don't get any child support. You're lucky I'm willing to pay anything

weeks

the

refused

has responded with, "I'll pay it when I damn well please11 and "MDst

Bettinger
wcmen

and

havoc with my

since my

bills

personal

budget

and

personal financial

bills are due on a set schedule and I cannot fail to pay

simply becaus Mr. Bettinger does not pay me child support on time.

a result of this, I have had to borrow money and use credit cards to live,

and

to make

Bettinger

up

the gaps between the time my bills are due and the time Mr.

finally

pays his

child

support. It is my desire that the court

grant me a judgment for child support arrearages pursuant to my Order to Show
Cause

which

is

the true subject matter of this action now before the court,

and that the court order Mr. Bettinger to pay future child support in a timely
manner to the court, rather than directly to me.
MATTERS REIATING TO SALE OF HOME
14.

Defendant

support,

the

two-thirds

of

eight

itself.

of

fact

been

on

unfair
benefits

percent

(8%)

increase on child support, the additional

payment as more child support, and the mortgage

This situation, and any hardship to defendant, are a result

that the heme has not sold in the two and one-half years it has

the market. This failure of the home to sell is a direct result of

defendant's
dealing

claims that is unfair for him to be assessed child

the mortgage

payment
the

now

unreasonableness

with
to

in

setting

the sales price on the home and in

the home when it has been listed for sale. It would be grossly

penalize me

guaranteed

by

to me

reducing my child support, or by taking away the
by

the Decree, in view of the fact that the

financial

squeeze defendant

and

I are both suffering is the result of his

unreasonable behavior with regard to the sale of the home.
15.

I remarried

in August, 1984.

This was

the

first

of

the

contingencies to occur referred to in Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce.

an

16.

At the time of my marriage to my new husband, my husband and I made

offer

to purchase Mr. Bettinger's equity in the home and to assume the

mortgage.

The

offer

was

for

cash of $22,869.00, which was calculated as

follows:
Total Value of Home in 1984

$85,000.00

Less 6% Real Estate Commission

5,100.00

Less Mortgage Existing in August, 1984
Less Estimated Costs of Sale Including Points and Fees
Less Estimated Costs of Improvements Necessary to Make the
Heme Saleable and/or Habitable, Including Installing a
New Roof and Ceilings

20,162.00
2,000.00

12,000.00

Sub-Total - Total Equity in Home

$45,783.00

Estimated Value of Mr. Bettinger's Equity as of August, 1984

$22,869.00

17.

My

husband

and

I arrived at the value of $85,000.00 based upon

advice given to us by three separate real estate agents who viewed the home in
the

sunnier of

interest

1984

rates

at

that, with a glut of houses on the market and mortgage

15%, the

home was unlikely to sell within a reasonable

period of time for more than $80,000.00 to $85,000.00, and that the roof would
need, to

be

replaced and other repairs would need, to be made on the property

before it would sell for that price.
18.

Defendant claimed, in September of 1984, that the true market value

of the home was $125,000.00, and he refused to accept the offer of $22,869.00.
I

listed

September

the
of

home
1984

for
for

sale with a real estate agency in Salt Lake City in
a sales price of $125,000.00, in accordance with the

0003

statement

of the defendant, even though I personally believed and real estate

agents advised me that they believed the home would not sell for more than the
$85,000.00.
19.

Since we

were

home

a

five-bedroom
outcome

of

That was
the

We

to move, we

three-bedroom

had

condominium

already

and

selected

a

were awaiting the

cusotdy issue to see how large a home we were going to need.

settled in February, 1985, and we immediately initiated purchase of

condominium,

stayed
a

the

and

anxious

closing

in 60 days. Although we were anxious to move, we

in the house over the sunnier, as our real estate agent advised us that

house

is much more showable and likely to sell if furnished and occupied.

agreed

to

stay

though we were
Bettinger

for

the sunnier to try to effectuate a timely sale, even

already making

payments

on

the condominium.

Since Mr.

would not accept our cash offer and the house did not sell over the

simmer, my

husband

and I eventually moved the family to the new location in

August of 1985, necessitating leaving the property vacant.
20.
two

From August of 1984 through August of 1985, the home was listed for

six-month

$113,000.00
person

real

for

even

estate

the

came

to

listing

listings.
from

The

listing

price was dropped to

February, 1985 to August, 1985. Not one

look at the home while it was listed for $125,000.00,

although several open houses were held. Only a few people came to look at the
home while

it was listed for $113,000.00. No one made any offer of purchase

on the property between August of 1984 and August of 1985.
21.

My husband and I spent a great deal of time and money refurbishing

the

home

and keeping it in condition to show during 1984 and 1985. Although

Mr.

Bettinger

actuality
rain

my

gutters

is

claiming the time we were in the home as a "free ride,'1 in

new husband painted the entire house, inside and out, installed
and

new

screens

throughout, bought

10

a new disposal, had new

OO0320

carpeting

installed

in

the

basement

and made numerous other repairs and

renovations entirely at his own expense and time. During the four years I had
the home before I remarried, Mr. Bettinger contributed nothing to the care and
upkeep, neither

physically or

financially, nor has he ever inquired of me,

even once, as to the status of the house the entire time it has been for sale.
My new husband, before we were married, carried the majority of the burden for
maintenance
are

on

the house, which is why its value is high today. His efforts

resulting

in nothing but gain for Mr. Bettinger as far as his equity is

concerned.
22.

After my husband and I moved out of the home in August, 1985, he and

I continued to do all maintenance and upkeep on the hone. Defendant has never
done

anything

husband

and

to maintain
I did

watering, weeding
even

all

and

the hcxne or keep it in a showable condition. My

the mowing, raking of leaves from 14 fruit trees,

general maintenance on the heme to keep it showable,

though we were no longer occupying the home. I bore the entire physical

and financial burden of upkeep while the house stood vacant, as well as having
the burden of maintaining my own home, working full-time, caring for two minor
children

and

working

toward

a

university

degree at night so that I could

better support myself and my children.
23.
a

The home had a flat roof which had been the single major drawback to

timely

listed

sale, other

for

than

the defendant's insistence that the property be

a ridiculously high sales price. During the extremely wet winter

and spring of 1985/1986, the flat roof deteriorated, causing major leakage and
ceiling

damage in five areas of the house. The ceilings collapsed completely

in

front

the

and
roof

repair.
over

hall in the early spring of 1986, necessitating major clean-up
I personally engaged the contractor who installed a new pitched

the

flat

roof and new ceilings on the interior of the home. The

11

nno:421

house was relisted for sale, in excellent saleable condition, at a sales price
of

$103,000.00 in the sunnier of 1986, and has been shown regularly since then

at

that price listing. We still received no offers on the home and regularly

received
We

feedback

lowered

the

from

sales

agents showing the home that the price was too high.
price

to $99,500.00

in the fall of 1986, and again

lowered it, to $93,500.00 in March, 1987.
24.

The

amount of money which

put into the home since my

remarriage

in

that

by Mr. Bettinger in house payments, yet he is subtracting one-half

the

paid

the

I have

form of maintenance, insurance and utilities has equalled

amount of that house payment from the child support paid to me, resulting

in my bearing 75% of the financial burden on the house for the past two years.
Mr. Bettinger earns seven times more money than I do.
25.

Mr. Bettinger has claimed the entire interest expense and property

tax expense on the home as a tax deduction for himself for the tax years 1984,
1985

and 1986. If I am, in fact, to be deemed to carry one-half the mortgage

burden
tax

on

the

benefits

1984,

property as Mr. Bettinger claims, then I ought to receive the

of making

the interest payments and property tax payments for

1985 and 1986, and we should be ordered to amend our income tax returns

accordingly.

Also, Mr. Bettinger

should

be required to reimburse me for

one-half the maintenance, utilities and insurance payments I have made.
26.

An accounting of my expenditures on the home is attached hereto and

incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit "C."
27.
paragraphs
her

entire

In

addition

to

the burdens I have been under referred to in the

above, defendant's mother passed away on October 1, 1986, leaving
estate to my four children and listing me at Trustee and Personal

Representative.

This has been a tremendously time-consuming proposition, in

addition to the other burdens which I have had for the past six months. I was

1?

nnQ3

physically

and

financially

additional

burden

insurance

agent

insurance

because

housesitter
one

room

tidy,

and

of

of

at

this
this

unable

to maintain the home adequately with the

estate

to manage.

time

I was also advised by my

that he was obliged to cancel my homeowner's

an unoccupied home was not insurable. I advertised for a

Elias Duran was the best applicant for the job. He occupies

the house and agreed to maintain the house and yard in a clean,

showable

condition, as well as make the home available to prospective

buyers, all of which he has done with a high degree of excellence. He also
agreed

that

presence

he would

upon notice in the event the house sold. Elifs

has also deterred break-ins and vandalism, which were a problem when

the

home was

the

house

unoccupied.

because

necessarily
would

move

be

I chose to have a housesitter rather than to rent

I was not prepared to offer a lease and renters could not

depended

upon

to have the house showable and available, nor

they be prepared to move quickly were an offer to purchase the house to

come

in.

They

likely might view it as being in their best interest to keep

the home in an unshowable condition to deter any sales.

the

28.

On March 25, 1987, I received an offer of purchase on the home for

sales

price of $90,000.00. We have countered to sell for $91,500.00. I

wish
to

to point out to the court and to defendant that $90,000.00 is very close
the $85,000.00

$90,000.00
the

has

home

has

partially

sales

price which

we offered in 1984, and the offer of

come after a new pitched roof has been placed on the home and
been completely repainted, interior and exterior, and has been

recarpeted. Had Mr. Bettinger accepted my offer to cash him out at
value of $85,000.00 in 1984, he would have received as much money

an

assumed

as

he is now going to receive as a result of the purchase offer that has been

accepted
result

of

in

1987.

Any

financial hardship Mr. Bettinger has suffered as a

paying both the mortgage payment and child support since 1984 is a
13

result

of his own unreasonable refusal to accept a fair market cash-out offer

two and one-half years ago.
ISSUES RELATED TO THE ORTHODONTIA BILL
29.
money

Defendant alleged in court, on March 24, 1987, that I had received

for our son's orthodontic bill but that I had refused to pay the bill.

This

is untrue.

I had never even been billed by the orthodontist much less

refused to pay. The total amount billed by the orthodontist, Dr. W. Stratton,
was

$2,050.00.

The amount paid by my insurance, Blue Cross Blue Shield, was

$1,000.00, which
policy.
owing
the

Cass

the

total allowable

amount payable under the

Bettinger has paid an additional $900.00. There is a balance

of $150.00, which is owing in full by Cass Bettinger under the terms of

Decree, Paragraph 6, which requires defendant to pay for all orthodontic

expenses
the

represents

of the children. A statement of the orthodontist to the effect that

total

amount

still owing on the bill is $150.00 is attached hereto and

incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit "D.ff
OTHER MATTERS
30.
income

The defendant earns an income in excess of $80,000.00 per year. My
is

$11,000.00

difference
hardships

in

per

year.

I ask the court to consider this income

considering the equities of who should pay financially for the

which have resulted from the failure of the heme to sell. Over the

past two years I have paid three times more in expenses than Mr. Bettinger has
paid in mortgage payments, and I did not receive any tax benefits.
31.
arrearages
with

I have

incurred

attorney's

fees

in pursuing the child support

and in pursuing the issue of the defendant's unreasonable behavior

regard

to

the

sale of the home. I request that the court award me my

court costs and attorney's fees herein.
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DATED THIS _£

day of

rfjtu/

, 1987.

CAROLYN JOYCE (BETTINGER) BOIES
Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Jj^

day of

ULflAj

ff

,

1987.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County
My commission expires:
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CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER aka
CAROLYN BOIES,

TRIAL MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff,
v.
CASS BETTINGER,
Civil No. D80-931
(Judge David Young)

Defendant.
—-ooOoo

The above matter came before the Court on Tuesday, the
9th day of February, 1988, at the hour of 8:00 a.m., the
Honorable David S. Young, Judge presiding, for hearing on
Defendant's Motion praying for relief to award the Defendant his
equity in the sum of $52,467.91, less the cost of capital improvements made by Plaintiff prior to August, 1984, to be distributed from the proceeds of the sale of the former marital
domicile of the parties.
1.

In support of Defendant's position that his equity

should be the sum of $52,467.91, less the costs of capital
improvements made prior to August, 1984, the Defendant presented
the following issues:

A.

That Defendant's equity is determined as of

August, 1984.
B.

Any increase or decrease in the market value of

the home after August, 1984, is the sole risk of the Plaintiff.
C.

Defendant is not liable for the costs of

improvements in the home after August, 1984.
D.

Defendant is not liable for costs of the recent

sale inasmuch as the sale was not the event which made his lien
due and payable.
E.

Defendant is not liable for the county taxes in

the sum of $818.12.
F.

Defendant is entitled to interest at the rate of

ten percent (10%) from August, 1984.
2.

Following hearing on Defendant's Motion before the

Court on December 12, 1987, an Order was entered making a partial
determination of the issues presented to the Court by Defendant's
Motion.

The Court entered its Order as follows:
A.

Defendant's equity in the marital domicile

would be determined based on the market value of the marital
domicile in August, 1984.
B.

Setting the evidentiary hearing of February 9,

1988, to determine the value of the marital domicile in August,
1984, and directing the parties to make arrangements for
appearance of their experts.
C.

Ordered that the term "improvements" as used in

the Decree of Divorce means "capital improvements" that enhance
the value of the marital domicile.

D.

Entered preliminary findings and conclusions

subject to change or amendment that:
(1) Cost of the sale of the marital domicile
shall be shared equally by the parties;
(2) Plaintiff will be liable for unpaid taxes
attributable to periods after August, 1984.
3.

At the hearing on February 9, 1988, the Court

received the testimony of the parties and their experts and
received documents and evidence upon the remaining issues presented by Defendant in support of his motion.

Pursuant to the

Order of the Courtf evidence was presented to determine the value
of the property in Augustf 1984. Evidence was also reserved upon
the issue of whether Defendant was entitled to interest on his
equity since August, 1984, because of unsatisfactory performance
on the part of the Plaintiff to accomplish the sale of the home
and the satisfaction of Defendant's equity lien.
4.

During closing argument, the Court asked counsel for

the Defendant what the final figure for distribution to the
Defendant should be.

Counsel for each of the parties

responded that a final figure could not be presented because a
determination had not been made for the costs of improvements.
Counsel for the Plaintiff further advised the Court that evidence
had not been presented to show the costs incurred by the
Plaintiff for the sale of the property and counsel for the
Defendant argued Defendant was not liable for the costs of sale.

5.

The Court advised counsel for each of the parties

that it intended to enter a final Order without further hearing
making distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the home and
that counsel for each of the parties should submit to the Court
their position for a final figure for Defendant's equity showing
calculations and documents in support of those calculations.
Plaintiff submits herewith her final figures for Defendant's
equity in compliance with the directions of the court.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff asserts that the value of the residence in
August, 1984f was $89,000.00 based upon the testimony and the
evidence presented at hearing.
be subtracted from that amount.

The mortgage of $20,304.00 should
It is undisputed that also

subtracted from that amount should be the costs of improvements.
The costs of sale should also be subtracted as per the Court's
Order,
Attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit n A M is
Plaintiff's Statement of the improvements ("Capital
Improvements"), which were made to the property.

The exhibit

contains only the improvements made through August, 1984. Other
capital improvements were made both before and after August,
1984; however, those improvements were made for the purpose of
enhancing the marketability of the property and are shown on
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.

All of the documents presented in support

of Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" have previously been presented to the

Defendant for inspection except checks numbered 264, 329, 405,
423, 593, and 594, and Plaintiff's check register, copies of
these documents are being delivered with this Memorandum.

Many

of the expenditures are cash or with a credit union which keeps
the checks.

The total amount paid by the Plaintiff for improve-

ments was $4,308.86.
The Court has entered a preliminary finding that the
parties will share the costs of sale equally.

Attached hereto as

Plaintiff's Exhibit "B" is a copy of correspondence dated January
27, 1986, written to the Plaintiff by the Defendant.

Said

correspondence is presented for the purpose of showing that
Defendant recognized on January 27, 1986, the need for significant repairs to the home which would cost between $5,000.00 and
$10,000.00, and that the Defendant considered such repairs to be
a cost of selling the home.

It is also presented to show that

many of the repairs which were performed by the Plaintiff in 1986
were suggested by the Defendant.

The exhibit shows that the

Plaintiff actually spent less to improve the marketability of the
home than was anticipated by the Defendant.

This does not

include the costs of the roof replacement which did not become
necessary until the ceiling collapsed about two months after
Defendant's correspondence.
light fixtures.

Plaintiff did paint and replace

She repaired paneling in the basement instead of

replacing it and took care of cabinets as suggested by the
Defendant, but only cleaned the carpet rather than replacing it.

Attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibit B C" is
Plaintiff's exhibit evidencing the amounts of money which she has
paid to enhance the marketability of the home for the sale as
required.

Plaintiff initially listed the home in Augustf 1984,

and made minor improvements to enhance the appearance of the
home.

These were made from July through October, 1984.

In 1985,

the Plaintiff replaced carpet to enhance the appearance of the
home, attempted to repair the roof and take care of water damage
in the ceiling, all to enhance the marketability of the home.
All of those actions were taken in February and May of 1985.
Then, in 1986, the Plaintiff expended substantial sums for
improvements to replace the roof and make the repairs required by
the collapsed ceiling.

She also made some of the improvements

suggested by the Defendant.

All of this was considered necessary

for the home to sell.
All of the documents presented in support of Exhibit "C"
have previously been examined by the Defendant except checks numbered 648, 667, 1034, 1038, 1078, 1267, 1279, 1294, 1304, 1305,
and 1309.

Copies of these checks are being forwarded to

Defendant with this Memorandum.

All checks support invoices

which have previously been submitted to the Defendant and examined by him.

The total costs of improvements made to the home

to improve its marketability for sale were $10,283.50, as shown
by Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.
In addition, real estate commissions and closing costs
were incurred in the sale of the home.

Trial Exhibit P3 shows

the closing costs were $6,113.00, unpaid taxes for 1987 were
$818.12, and the charge for the garbage disposal was $100.00.
The Court has already ruled that the Plaintiff will be liable for
the taxes for 1987 in the amount of $818.12. The remainder of
the costs of sale totals $6,213.00.

The total costs of sale were

$16f496.50.
Based upon the foregoing, it is Plaintiff's position
that Defendant's equity should be the value of the home,
$89,000.00 less the mortgage, $20,304.00, less the costs of
improvements, $4,308.86, less the costs of sale, $16,496.50,
leaving a balance of $47,890.64. Pursuant to the requirements of
paragraph 7, Defendant's equity is one-half of that amount or
$23,945.32.
Plaintiff believes that based upon the evidence presented at the hearing in this matter, that the Defendant should
not be entitled to interest on his equity and that an Order
should be entered directing disbursement of the funds with
payment of Defendant's equity in the amount of $23,945.32.
is
DATED t hlis

of February., 1988.

^ - g ^ ^ ^ ^
lA^G M./PETERSON
:orney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Trial Memorandum to

Robert M. McDonald, Attorney for Defendant, MCDONALD & BULLEN,
American Plaza IIIf 47 West 200 South, Suite 450, Salt Lake Cityf
Utah

84101, this

/£

^clay of Febr^rJ^ 1988.
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CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579
E. PAUL WOOD - 3537
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER nka
CAROLYN BOIES,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
CASS BETTINGER,
Civil No. 88-0559-CA
Category 14(b)

Defendant/Appellant.
ooOoo
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and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT BRIEF to Robert M.
McDonald, MCDONALD & BULLEN, American Plaza III, 47 West 200
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